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Abstract
This article is a synthesis of a phenomenon – banditry in Catalonia – which peaked in the century and a half between approximately 
1500 and 1630. In this article, by ‘banditry’ we mean the kind waged by both the upper classes and nobility and the lower classes. With 
forerunners in the late Middle Ages, banditry is ultimately part of a history of social transversality in all sectors, which seriously hin-
dered its official repression – from the Crown to the Diputació del General (General Deputation) – because bandits had infiltrated all 
the institutions, including the Reial Audiència (Appellate Court). This article then describes the most vivid periods of banditry, its 
leading personalities or groups, including the nyerros and cadells, and the savage violence that it generated far and wide. Nonetheless, 
a minimal comparison with broad swaths of the Mediterranean reveals that banditry is not unique to the history of Catalonia.
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Introduction: A historical memory little 
known over the centuries
As a disciple of my master, Joan Reglà, a true pioneer in 
the serious study of Catalan banditry, I am pleased that 
by asking me for this synthesis which should be clear and 
intelligible to everyone, the Institut d’Estudis Catalans 
has shown that it still recognises Joan Reglà’s presence in 
Catalonia, especially when much of his university in-
struction took place in Valencia owing to the displace-
ment of university teaching positions. For 14 years, 1959 
to 1972, Joan Reglà promoted research in Valencia but 
stopped it in Catalonia by stopping his initial studies on 
banditry. These studies later evolved and revealed a com-
plexity, yet also questions, that even further complicate 
my attempt to summarise the topic. The only way I can 
find to approach this article is to present it from a per-
spective in which the knowledge and interpretation keep 
shifting over time, and one which is comparative. Ulti-
mately, despite Catalan banditry’s prime role in literary 
and historical memory, it was not exactly a unique phe-
nomenon from the past, nor was it solely centred in the 
16th and 17th centuries. Another topic is banditry’s peak 
in Catalonia, the now-classic century of somewhat un-
bridled violence between at least 1539 and 1633, as I shall 
explain.
However, factions and banditry had already existed 
since the 14th century; they are not as well known, but 
they have been studied to some degree and are the clear 
forerunners of the subsequent peak in the Modern Age. 
Without entering the debate on the meaning of these two 
words right now, there is a common denominator that 
joins them: armed violence, either with groups through-
out the entire country or more locally in nuclei in villages 
and cities. The most solid knowledge from the Middle 
Ages primarily stresses the latter – urban factions – 
through the banding together of groups that managed to 
connect the different estates in society on one side and 
other opposing factions, be they bourgeois, noble or cler-
gy, on the other. Therefore, as the Latin expression says, 
“Amicus inimici inimicus est”: the enemy of my enemy is 
my friend. Flocel Sabaté has studied this issue in the late 
mediaeval world, not only in Catalonia, and stressed that 
at that time this kind of behaviour, and even vendettas, 
were “quite clear to the people then, and a major inherit-
ance was woven for the subsequent centuries”.1He was 
primarily discussing the 16th and 17th centuries, although 
since the last third of the 14th century the consequences of 
the Bubonic Plague and the 1388 uprising of the peasant-
ry, either serfs or otherwise (those linked to the mals usos 
or bad customs of the lords), had also led to violence in the 
rural world among people that until then had been living 
under the heavy yoke of the Catalan seigniorial realms.
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Having said all that, it should be noted that Catalan 
banditry reached its peak during the first century and a 
half of the Modern Age. What is more, it was quite fa-
mous even in Castilian Golden Age literature.2 Famous 
Catalan bandits included Antoni Roca, the factional lead-
er who was executed in 1546 and brought to the theatre 
years later by Lope de Vega, along with Rocaguinarda, 
whom Cervantes mentioned in Don Quixote. In turn, the 
bandits were also mentioned in popular Catalan songs 
back in their day.3 Later, in 1858, the 19th-century histo-
rian and novelist Víctor Balaguer wrote the play Don Juan 
de Serrallonga or Los bandoleros de las Guillerías, and the 
bandits even appear in several verses by Joan Maragall 
from 1900. These are just a handful of examples of the 
popularity of Catalan banditry in the country’s folklore, 
regardless of whether it is treated in a more or less ideal-
ised fashion, as in Maragall, or more critically. In reality, 
the bellicosity of the Catalans during that period was re-
ported beyond the country’s borders in Europe, and even 
the Enlightenment philosopher Voltaire said in the 18th 
century that Catalonia’s “inhabitants are always warring, 
and the mountain-dwellers are particularly ferocious”.4
We are aware of important names among the ranks of 
Catalan bandits and their clashes with each other, which 
were interpreted differently by 19th-century Catalan Ro-
manticism and during the Renaixença depending on 
whether they were nyerros or cadells, as I shall explain be-
low. Víctor Balaguer described the nyerros as “liberals or 
progressives”, at odds with the absolutism of the Haps-
burgs and the most immediate political forerunners of the 
Catalan Revolt in 1640, while the cadells represented con-
servatism and sought to collaborate with the monarchy. 
Antoni de Bofarull viewed the cadells as the defenders of 
the cities, while he viewed the nyerros as more feudal 
groups from the petty nobility, Benedictine monasteries 
and other more reactionary nuclei.5 In short, at the dawn 
of the 20th century, the banditry that was so familiar to 
historical memory that it stimulated an idealisation or 
condemnation of its deeds was, in fact, a virtually un-
known historical phenomenon.
Factions, banditry and bandits:  
Similar yet different concepts
Since then, a great deal of headway has been made in 
studies on banditry, either in the diverse concepts that the 
word harbours or in knowledge of the different document 
sources. Regarding the former, even today it is surprising 
that the travel diary of an Italian from the early 16th cen-
tury, the Florentine ambassador Francesco Guicciardini, 
who travelled to the Court of the Catholic King in 1512, 
expressed the interwoven unity of the different forms of 
banditry. Guicciardini explains how he travelled across 
much of Catalonia and that “the entire region from Per-
pignan to Barcelona, and even further, are dangerous 
places”. He adds the fact that “many knights and gentle-
men of Catalonia are each other’s enemies”. They were 
constantly at odds with each other, which “they can be 
lawfully due to an old privilege in the kingdom”. Guic-
ciardini knew even more: for starters, the adversary had 
to be officially notified of the fight five days in advance, 
and increasingly all the relatives and loyal followers who 
wanted to joined in. When needed, if there were no more 
forces, they went to “the malefactors of the country” seek-
ing assistance. The latter, including lords, owned sites and 
castles where the king had no authority, so criminals 
could take refuge and be protected and fed there. In his 
diary, Guicciardini even seems to act as a reporter for fu-
ture generations when he writes that “from this banditry 
– as it is called – there follows that these bandits, lacking 
in money and convinced that they have permission to do 
so, spend their lives attacking travellers”.
Guicciardini makes statements with the precision of a 
lawyer because to him the mountainous region, which 
was sparsely inhabited and even less watched over by the 
royal authorities, made it possible – with the possible ex-
aggeration of a fearful traveller – for “all Catalans to be 
armed, and you can find them on the roads with swords, 
flintlocks and crossbows”. To his mind, there is a constant 
rash of murders, divisions and enmities, which the major-
ity of towns are behind, “and thus a great deal of homicide 
and disorder is sown”.6 Beyond a bit of exaggeration, es-
pecially if we compare this situation, which he recounted 
in 1512, with the events years later, the Florentine ambas-
Figure 1. Close-up of the Cobles de la mort de Galipapo, a work by 
writer Pere Giberga, sheet 67r (Biblioteca de Catalunya).
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sador could not be a more accurate and, I would almost 
venture to say, incisive historian. Ultimately, he discerned 
what the factions and bandits were and how from the ini-
tial situation of engaging in private fights one can move to 
the concept of thieves, highwaymen and, in a word, crim-
inals of all stripes.
With all the complexity and doubts which have arisen 
after recent serious studies, historians today would define 
the former as the factions engaged in private violent con-
flicts which were legal at that time. We could summarise 
this as the banditry of the nobility. However, we should 
also bear in mind that depending on an entire series of 
factors, popular banditry also existed around it. For this 
reason, with a certain rhetoric which reveals the difficul-
ties of the issue when expressing it in a single concept, Xa-
vier Torres wonders the following about banditry: “The 
same name, the same thing?”7 It can thus come as no sur-
prise that when conducting archival research, historians 
may be led to widely divergent situations. Ultimately, re-
gardless of its social system, be it feudal-noble, the early 
years of mercantile capitalism or any other kind since the 
start of history, an impoverished society will always lead 
to a kind of subsistence banditry, the oldest and most 
spontaneous means of survival. However, in the late Mid-
dle Ages and Modern Age, when the hierarchy of the es-
tates was considerable, what survived the most was a kind 
of banditry whose underpinnings lay in the laws of the 
day and the country that permitted it. If one feeds off the 
other in circumstances that nurture their survival, it is 
very difficult to eradicate, and this is ultimately what hap-
pened with Catalan banditry in the 16th and 17th centu-
ries, if not earlier.
Far earlier, in the Middle Ages with the same urban 
factions that later spread around the entire country, Cata-
lan legislation could not totally stop the factions and pri-
vate fighting. This permissiveness was virtually sacred, 
even though since Ferdinand II there had been attempts 
to channel it better in both the Kingdom of Valencia and 
the Principality of Catalonia, just to cite two examples. 
This happened with the Valencia furs (codes of law) of 
Oriola printed in 1493 and in the sections on “De guiatges 
e treves” (On guidance and truce) for “rich men, nobles 
and knights spasa cints”, as well as the rubric on “Guerre-
jar” (waging war), each of which sought to regulate armed 
conflicts more than eliminate them.8 Eliminating would 
have been difficult when the Courts, the country’s legisla-
tive assemblies, had always had a military or noble branch 
that was totally opposed to a decision that would be so 
draconian for them.
In Catalonia, the section entitled “When an individual 
may take vengeance without a judge” of a legal constitu-
tion from 1503 stated the possible revenges allowed to the 
offended party without prior notice or public challenge 
five days before the conflict. This was called “el deseixi-
ment amb lletres o carta pública” (assurance with words 
or a public letter). “La batalla a ultrança” (the battle to the 
end) also existed, a personal combat between two clash-
ing nobles with the king as the referee. Thus far, royal in-
tervention with the law strove for a utopia: stopping the 
private wars in which much of the country was enmeshed, 
since there were fewer and fewer personal – or chivalrous 
– battles. Conversely, there was a profusion of challenging 
posters, over mere words, or bids to take advantage of cer-
tain waterways or pastures or for other owners to gain ac-
cess to evicted farms. Anything served as an excuse to 
provoke violent armed conflicts which could range from 
seigniorial banditry to tamp down rebellion among the 
vassals of the seigniorial domain to the latter’s reaction as 
they sought other protectors from factions and bandits 
and hired them. Obviously, there was also the possibility 
of appealing to the royal courts of justice, but this was not 
a common choice since there was no guarantee of neutral 
arbitration when the accomplice of some gang might be 
seated behind the bench. If needed, “friendly arrangers” 
were preferred, that is, both parties’ acceptance of a cer-
tain number of arbitrators or mediators whose rulings be-
fore the notaries that authenticated them “must obligato-
rily be fulfilled”, according to the Catalan constitutions.9
Despite this, this formula was in the minority given the 
rise in factions all over the country. However, over time – 
certainly since well into the 16th century – this gave rise 
to the famous battles between the nyerros and cadells was 
because of the prominence of private wars and the play of 
family and cliente list rivalries and alliances, all of which 
were capable “of subsuming and framing the multiplicity 
of private grievances in antagonistic networks that were 
more generic and hierarchically organised”.10 Perhaps 
this was the reason behind its polarisation into two main 
parties, which was nothing other than a cluster of local 
factions. Based on his extensive knowledge of Catalan 
banditry, this is Xavier Torres’ thesis regarding the origin 
of the initial conflicts between Joan Cadell, the Lord of 
Arsèguel in the Cerdagne region, whose actions were 
known since the first half of the 16th century, and Tomàs 
de Banyuls i de Llupià, Lord of Nyer in the Conflent re-
gion. Both Pyrenean noblemen covered, either actually or 
symbolically, the breadth of a form of Catalan banditry 
which was essentially noble, but not until the 1580s, be-
cause if it is true that the development of banditry always 
needed the support of accomplices, powerful elements in 
the country which remained in the shadows as long as 
they could be, perhaps the expression of the lawyer Jeroni 
Pujades, “they are all nyerros and cadells, which exist in 
Catalonia like the Guelphs and Ghibellinesin Italy”, was 
not as real in the diversity of bandit networks.11 I think 
that these words instead come from a supposed simplicity 
which does not reflect the multiplicity of banditry which 
is currently requiring some changes in research, even 
though back in 1615 the castellan of Amposta wrote the 
following to the king:
[...] que todo el principado de Catalunya está dividido 
en dos vandos de ñarros y cadels, y que siguen cada una 
destas parcialidades su enemistad antigua y con tanta 
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pasión heredada de padres y abuelos que sólo por ella, 
sin que preceda otra cosa, toman los unos contra los 
otros las armas....12
However, even though this noble banditry had accom-
plices that were not lacking in wealth, such as the relatives 
of the Duke of Cardona, just to mention the most aristo-
cratic family in the country, it is curious that it began to 
surge in Catalonia during the early Modern Age. Obvi-
ously it had already existed previously, as Guicciardini 
witnessed directly in 1512, but its tensions at that time 
were minimal compared to the ensuing years. This surge 
was so pronounced that the Emperor Charles V was 
forced to deal with it. On the 7th of March 1539, he signed 
a pragmatic against Catalan banditry in Toledo with an 
entire series of important points: the ban on travelling in 
gangs; the definition of a gang, which applied when more 
than three armed people travelled together; punishments 
for the aquadrillats or gang members, and even sentences 
of two years in the galleys; punishments of “perdre lo 
puny” (losing their weapon) for anyone carrying a cross-
bow, harquebus or rifle; the persecution of criminals; and 
facilities given to the royal officers to capture aquadrillats 
in villages, squares, castles, baron’s realms and even 
churches. This last issue was extremely sacred at that time 
because if a bandit took refuge in a church, the royal offic-
ers were not allowed to enter it and search for them. 
Charles V not only published the pragmatic but also 
shortly thereafter sent the Marquis of Llombai, Francesc 
de Borja, as the viceroy with the remit to put an end to the 
bandits at any price, with Joanot Cadell named as an 
armed activist. Between 1539 and 1543, the future saint 
endured the struggle against banditry while he also “had 
around thirty masses said for each defendant who was 
sent to be judged”.13
However, their efforts did not bear much fruit, as ban-
ditry among the nobility was soon joined by popular ban-
ditry, the kind that Joan Reglà researched the most, pub-
lishing works first written in the 20th century based on 
documents from the Archive of the Crown of Aragón.14 
Even today, his timeline divided in different stages re-
mains intact, just like our knowledge of many of the 
names of the Catalan bandits. Moreu Cisteller and Antoni 
Roca were the most famous during the reign of Charles V. 
Afterwards, during the reign of Philip II, the prominent 
gangs were led by Bartomeu Camps, Montserrat Poch, 
Tomàs de Banyuls and the Cadell bastard and Felip Quer-
alt, who summoned 200 armed men. However, if the situ-
ation was dire in the late 16th century, it was even worse 
in the first third of the 17th century, not so much because 
of the bandits like Perot Rocaguinarda, Trucafort, Talla-
ferro and the Margarit brothers, or the swan song of Joan 
Sala Ferrer, alias Serrallonga, all of whom were explosive, 
but especially because of the repressive violence exercised 
by viceroys like Almazán, Alburquerque and Alcalá, just 
to cite the ones known the most extensively, even by such 
eminent Hispanists like Elliott.15
Before examining other issues, we should ask the rea-
son behind the situation between 1538, Charles V’s prag-
matic and the execution of Serrallonga in January 1634, 
when banditry did continue but was no longer the same, 
although it was connected to the Catalan Revolt of 1640. 
Braudel clearly exerts an influence in this second popular 
concept which the French historian spread around the 
entire Mediterranean.16 Simply put, the bandits that 
emerged from the commoners mostly responded to a rise 
in prices, as proven by Earl Hamilton,17 and a supposed 
expanding mercantile capitalism which not everyone 
supported. When the document research on Catalan ban-
ditry began, what was primarily underscored was com-
mon banditry; the nobility were also known to be in-
volved, although our knowledge of this facet of banditry 
was not as clear as it is today. Ultimately, the proliferation 
of the latter could not have taken place only among the 
nobility, even if the Catalan petty nobility and certain ele-
ments of the clergy were included. It is true that Joan 
Reglà constantly stressed this issue. However, years later 
Xavier Torres – whose entire oeuvre underscores the role 
of banditry among the nobility, since “there are no ban-
dits without lords”, as even the kings’ officers noted – rec-
ognised that this expression, though partly well ground-
ed, was overly unilateral. The composition of the gangs 
was quite telling, because two out of every three bandits 
were peasants or the sons of country folk from different 
Figure 2. Close-up of the inside of the Cobles on the justice and 
cruel death of Antoni Roca. Cançoner de les obretes en nostra lengua 
materna més divulgades durant els segles xiv, xv i xvi, sheet 57r 
(Biblioteca de Catalunya).
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social echelons, either gentlemen from wealthy estates 
(Perot Rocaguinarda), sons of family manors which had 
seen better days (Joan Sala Serrallonga) or poor, indebted 
tenant farmers (the Trucafort brothers).
However, this profile does not end here, since one-
fourth of the gang members were or had been artisans or 
tradesmen. In a word, Xavier Torres believes that the ma-
jority of the bandits showed common traits, more similar 
– albeit with all the nuances needed – to men who were not 
exactly well-off and rich. Obviously, these nuances should 
be borne in mind, but for now there is nothing to refute the 
idea that most common bands did not contradict Reglà’s 
claims, especially those who were searching for loot and 
money and waged attacks on the roads, in addition to – 
logically – clashing with the forces of the royal authorities. 
What is more, this idea was formulated when it was be-
lieved that the economy of the Principality had been stag-
nant for much of the 16th century. Therefore, the Catalan 
bandits were described as the “children of misery”,18 a 
more radical expression today, yet not totally untrue. After 
all, of Vicens Vives’ ideas19 about Ferdinand II’s lukewarm 
redress – that is, recovery – of Catalonia after the Civil War 
of 1462-1472, the demographic knowledge of Jordi Nadal 
and Emili Giralt,20 which meant a long 15th century in 
Catalonia only to return to the figures prior to the popula-
tion losses in the late mediaeval crisis, and the stages of 
slow growth in the 16th century studied by Pierre Vilar,21 
did not seem like sufficient reasons to tinker with the social 
and economic composition known by Joan Reglà in 1966.
Despite this, the somewhat similar study by Garcia Es-
puche criticises, seriously and perhaps with too many de-
finitively unconfirmed hypotheses, the now-classic inter-
pretations by other historians. In Garcia Espuche’s 
opinion, the Catalan economy entered a clear century of 
expansion between 1550 and 1640,22 precisely the most 
violent years of Catalan banditry. Beyond the questions 
that Oriol Junqueras23 poses when casting doubt on Gar-
cia Espuche’s positions on this decisive century, we 
should add that even if we accept his thesis, there is noth-
ing that weakens the difficult and negative plight of some 
impoverished people who had not yet secured positions 
within the social and economic rise of this supposed deci-
sive century. What is more, I would add that if this expan-
sion did not favour everyone, the ones who were harmed 
the most might have become increasingly violent. And 
there were many aggrieved parties during that period: 
from the nobility to the clergy in some places, along with 
artisans and lowlier peasants.
Regarding the nobility, we should consider the petty 
nobility, to whom many privileges were off-limits, and 
the arrival of the Hapsburgs in Catalonia did not favour 
them. Ultimately, there were few positions in the royal 
government and many fadristerns – children born after 
the primogenitor of a family in which the institution of 
the hereu (in which all family assets went to the eldest-
born son) prevented the properties under the stewardship 
of the firstborn from being divided – who were virtually 
obligated to join either the army or the Church. If they 
chose neither, many members of the petty nobility could 
be left out in the cold, and some of them – although, obvi-
ously, not all of them – might have earned a living from 
banditry. Not for nothing, as Joan Reglà noted, the knight 
Francesc de Gilabert in 1616 wrote: “Las bandosidades 
son la base de todo nuestro daño [...]. Nace este daño de 
otra causa, y es que por los pocos oficios que tiene Su 
Majestad para dar a caballeros en Cataluña y por repartir 
los de su real casa en castellanos, esperan poco los deste 
principado en alcançar merced.”24
Regarding the Church, we should distinguish between 
bishops and canons, whose situation was not the same. 
The bishops were appointed by the monarchy with the 
permission of the Pope, and they often became viceroys, 
especially in the early 17th century, around the time of 
banditry’s swan song. The same did not hold true of the 
canons, not to mention the parishes or monasteries. One 
clear example was the monastery of Montserrat, Benedic-
tines who since the late 15th century had depended upon 
the regulatory power which had gradually moved further 
away, as far as Valladolid, which witnessed the arrival of 
Castilian friars throughout the 16th century.
With regard to the rural world, besides rich farmers, 
emphyteutae or landowners, there was a mass of impov-
erished tenant farmers and day labourers. And the urban 
world was in a similar situation, since some sectors flour-
ished from a clear economic and social ascent, while some 
artisans were marching towards gradual proletarisation, 
as Agustí Alcoberro has stressed in his attempt to show 
the social stratification that polarised Baroque Catalonia. 
Therefore, Catalan banditry can be explained from a mul-
tiplicity of facets which span from the nobility to the com-
moners. However, the economic situation, whether stag-
nant or ascendant, does not explain everything. What is 
more, in around 1600, as a result of the start, if not the 
end, of certain changes (agricultural, manufacturing, 
commercial), there was an instability in this supposedly 
decisive century, more in quality than in quantity, which 
led to a stagnation if not a slight decline, which became 
truly visible after 1620. This can even be seen in monetary 
issues – the appearance of false coins, also called boscatera 
– and the plans for the Banc de Barcelona, approved de-
finitively by the Consell de Cent (Council of One Hun-
dred) on the 10th of October 1609. All of this further 
stirred up social instability around Catalan banditry.25 
Despite this, there are many other circumstances which 
must be taken into account, from geographies and bor-
ders to ideologies, religions and politics at the very least.
Other causes of the survival of banditry
Even though Joan Reglà had pointed out the reality of ban-
ditry on the plains, since many bandits hailed from there, 
Xavier Torres has shown that the most famous site known 
to historians until quite recently was the mountains. Ulti-
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mately, the factions, especially those in the Pyrenees, 
sought hideouts in the mountains where it was the most 
difficult for the repressive forces to reach. This is even true 
of those who almost reluctantly – although this also de-
pends on the time – came from the unions or brother-
hoods, that is, from the working classes spurred by the 
viceroys. As the Marquis of Almazán, one of the most zeal-
ous viceroys to govern the Principality, wrote in 1613, it 
was difficult to secure the people’s collaboration, perhaps 
because “one must leave this city and go up into the moun-
tains”,26 although surely this is not the real reason. In 1616, 
the aforementioned Francesc de Gilabert, a former bandit 
and later paer (municipal authority) of Lleida, stressed the 
fact that Catalonia was a “mostly mountainous, barren 
land”. And in 1639, shortly after the death of Serrallonga, 
verses in Spanish claimed: “Montuosa Cataluña [...] / cada 
monte es un castillo, / cada sierra una muralla, / cada risco 
es una torre / y toda una plaza de armas”.27
The mountains were a safe harbour if they were located 
near the border. Despite this, for the inhabitants of the 
neighbouring villages the border was never an impedi-
ment to good relations, despite a few altercations.
Regarding the border with France, the most compli-
cated of them all for higher-order political issues, we 
know that the Pyrenees did not always serve as a wall sep-
arating the people living in these lands, and this was true 
not only in Catalonia but also in Aragón and Navarra. 
However, difficulties did start to arise because the mod-
ern states, which developed increasingly after the Renais-
sance and the late Middle Ages, tried to make the borders 
virtually impenetrable as the monarchies at the heads of 
these states were increasingly at loggerheads with each 
other, be they Habsburgs, Valoises or Bourbons, the latter 
at odds with Henry IV since 1593. Military conflicts mag-
nified tensions after the reign of Charles V (no need to 
enter into details) but especially during the times of Philip 
II, and any peace during those years was always fragile.
Quite often, those conflicts were also associated with 
religious pressure from southern France, which could be 
described more as Lutheran than Huguenot based on the 
documents from that time, regardless of whether they 
come from the viceroyalty or Council of Aragón (mostly 
from royal Castilian functionalities) or the Diputació del 
General (General Deputation) of Catalonia, the consuls of 
Puigcerdà and La Seu d’Urgell or the canons in La Seu 
d’Urgell, all of them Catalan, just to cite a few very clear 
examples.28 And despite the fact that Lluís Obiols himself 
describes these claims as an excuse (on page 10 of the 
aforementioned book), only a cursory look at the texts 
from the 1580s and 1590s highlights what Reglà always 
upheld, which many studies later accepted: the presence 
of the French and some Lutherans or Huguenots. Ulti-
mately, immigrants to Catalonia from Gascony, Occitania 
and France, so thoroughly familiar to Nadal and Giralt, as 
mentioned above, lead us to assume that not all of them 
adapted as they should have and that some maladapted 
individuals might have turned to the banditry of impover-
ished exiles.29 What is more, these bandits were mistreat-
ed by the justice of the country for any illegal act commit-
ted out of a need to eat, as Valentí Gual30 revealed by using 
the vast store of documentation from the archive of Pob-
let,31 which he has generally made available to researchers 
who have mined it well,32 confirming Joan Reglà’s ideas. 
Jaume Codina makes similar claims when he underscores 
the heavy presence of poor people in the counties of the 
Baix Llobregat, including villagers and farmers, as well as 
a vast number of French immigrants fearful of being the 
victims of attacks and robberies of all kinds.33
Today, despite all this, according to the opinions of oth-
er historians, primarily the aforementioned Xavier Torres 
and Núria Sales, we can reach the conclusion that the Cas-
tilian officials’ accusations came from a real lack of knowl-
edge of the country and from the fact that the Catalans’ 
own accusations, though somewhat true, concealed 
neighbourly and baronial disputes and jurisdictional strife 
on either side of the Pyrenees which has been researched 
the most to date, all of which was further aggravated dur-
ing the more conflictive periods. After all, Occitanians – 
just a handful of them – might own lands in northern 
Catalonia and, vice-versa, Catalans owned places in 
southern France. Núria Sales notes that “throughout the 
French religious wars, the lands of the Crown of Aragón 
and the Huguenot or half-Huguenot territories in the 
house of Foix-Bearnor the lower Languedoc were inter-
spersed with Bearnaise or French lands which remained 
Catholic”.34 In other words, she claims that the link be-
tween the Huguenots and Catalan banditry is not so facile.
However, determined to dig further in our research, 
and aware today of the mutable, apolitical nature of the 
Catalan bandits, we know that Philip II recruited certain 
bandits – Tomàs de Banyuls is one example – to turn 
them into his agents at the service of the French Catholic 
League of Enric de Guisa in the years (1590-1593) prior to 
the coronation of the Bourbon King Henry IV.35 This sit-
uation is quite curious compared to the claims to the con-
trary. Therefore, more than ideological or religious, the 
border used to be jurisdictional, and disputes have often 
been discovered even between the lords and the monar-
chy, which sought to recover or expand its royal assets 
that had been lost or mortgaged in the past, perhaps pav-
ing the way for Catalan and Aragonese banditry, with 
clear interferences of the former in the latter.
Two examples prove this. The first of them is Catalan: 
because of a debt she had contracted, Germana de Foix 
granted the Viscountship of Castellbò with user’s rights 
to Lluís Oliver de Boteller in 1528. The countship, nestled 
in the heart of the Pyrenees near Andorra, was an ante-
chamber for contraband, including horses, jurisdictional 
scuffles, French infiltrations and bandits. These were the 
early days of Joanot Cadell, the Lord of Arsèguel, who at 
the request of Oliver de Boteller engaged in a violent clash 
with the vassals of the countships who wanted to return to 
the Crown. A problem that should have been resolved in 
favour of the royalty virtually became an affair of state 
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throughout the 1530s and 1540s in the midst of the con-
flicts between Charles V and the French monarchy.36
The second example comes from Aragón: Banditry 
also took its toll in the countship of Ribagorça through 
both Aragonese gangs and Catalan gangs with a new bor-
der, now in the kingdom of Aragón. The issue even be-
came a social problem. We should bear in mind that in 
around the mid-16th century, the inhabitants of Rib-
agorça wanted the countship to be restored to the Crown. 
Some Catalan bandits such as Guillem de Josa and Perot 
de Llupià had supported the counts. However, the issue 
was aggravated for years after a royal ruling (1554) in fa-
vour of the vassals of Ribagorça and their rejection of the 
Court of Justice of Aragón in 1567. The problem had not 
yet been resolved by around the 1580s. In an effort to re-
solve it by force, the Duke of Villahermosa hired bandits 
from Aragón and Lleida, such as the famous Francesc de 
Gilabert and the Baron of Nyer in the Cerdagne. And 
against them, the Valls brothers, also from Lleida, along 
with Minyó de Montellà and the second Joan Cadell, the 
Lord of Arsèguel, took the side of the Ribagorça syndics. 
Tallying the acts of extortion committed on Aragonese 
soil, and even the attacks on the villages of Grau and Be-
navarri, most of them waged by the cadells, would be a 
sideshow. The main upshot is that once the negotiations 
to include the countship in the Crown had gotten under-
way in late 1588, although time would be needed to ac-
complish this, the virulence between the Catalan bandits 
continued in Catalonia.37
Or more accurately, they returned to the country where 
they had always existed and had never fallen by the way-
side. In this sense, the Valls brothers – originally cadells – 
and the Gilabert brothers – closer to nyerros – clashed in 
the lands of Lleida to such an extent that a “lliga de cav-
allers” (league of knights) led by the Valls was formed in 
the capital of Lleida. There were also major conflicts, like 
the siege of Cubells in 1589, where people siding with the 
son of the mayor of Alós (cadell) had taken refuge; the 
knights from the Lleida league and the Valls brothers 
went to their aid, while those waging the siege were nyer-
ros in league with Francesc de Gilabert, naturally.38 There 
is not enough room to recount everything that happened 
in this region39 even before this time, nor what happened 
in the western regions, including Alt Urgell and Cervera. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, research is under-
way to expand local knowledge, such the examples cited 
below.40 However, I do want to go back to the Cerdagne 
because the origins of the nyerros and cadells were there. 
What is more, the authorities never pardoned the cadells 
for Minyó de Montellà’s attack on a load of coins from the 
Order of Saint John of Jerusalem in 1587.41 We also know 
that the coins had reached Arsèguel. Two sieges between 
1588 and 1592 ended with the destruction of the castle 
and Joan Cadell’s flight to Foix, beyond the French bor-
der. And yet even though Banyuls accepted offers to serve 
the monarchy and Cadell never returned to Catalonia, 
banditry in the Pyrenees did not end.42
Nor did it end in the rest of Catalonia because there 
were more borders, such as the banks of the Ebro River, 
which has been studied very little to date. This border 
with the Kingdom of Valencia witnessed many events, as 
did Viceroy Francesc de Borja when he reached Tortosa, 
the gateway to Catalonia in the south, in 1539. As he 
swore an oath to the constitutions of the Principality he 
said, with reference to the castle of Tortosa “que en lugar 
de ser reyno y defensa de los vasallos de V. M. no sirve sino 
Figure 3. Apunyalament d’un home 
davant de la porta de l’església, Solsona 
1626. Santuari del Miracle, Riner. The 
photo is by Ramon Manent (Mataró). 
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de cueva de ladrones y para amparo de los de ser vi do-
res”.43And Viceroy Borja was not mistaken, because the 
information on the city and territory of the banks of the 
Ebro River provided by the most recent research is indis-
putable. It shows a maelstrom of violence of all sorts 
among the Church, nobility and commoners, along with 
responses through dubious unions of the people and ban-
dits which lasted more than a century. A few examples il-
lustrate this. The attempted kidnapping of Bishop Ferran 
de Lloaces by Canon Tomàs Costa in 1557 brought the 
most paradigmatic (albeit not the only) case to the top 
echelons of the Church. This ultimately reflected the 
bishop’s quandary: he was a foreigner from Oriola and 
Valencia, a Tridentine after the Council’s second session, 
a man who resided in his bishopric, unlike the majority of 
his predecessors, but most importantly, he had made a 
pastoral visit to the cathedral and its canons in which he 
condemned the dissolute life led by many of them, in-
cluding Tomàs Costa. The response was a plan to kidnap 
the bishop on the 15th of August, but it failed miserably, 
even in the subsequent legal battle.44
More prestigious in terms of both the protagonists in-
volved and the actions committed were the noble acts of 
banditry undertaken for years by Lluís Oliver de Boteller, 
the Viscount of Castellbò, often in the lands of the Ebro 
River, and his right-hand man (albeit later turncoat), the 
squire Cristòfol Despuig, who for years was immortalised 
by his Col·loquis de la insigne ciutat de Tortosa. Thanks to 
this book and the documentation used, we are aware of 
the clashes between families from the petty nobility, ones 
that were not exactly wealthy and had no royal posts – 
“because those castellans devour it all”45 – and voting 
places of the military branch of the Generalitat: “the idol 
that all adore with great devotion”.46 Despuig managed to 
secure an administrative post in the municipal govern-
ment only in the 1540s and 1550s, but his return to ban-
ditry during the 1560s sent him abroad for some years to 
Traiguera, in Valencia’s Maestrat region. That was where 
the noble bandits went into exile, as did Lluís Oliver de 
Boteller and his son, required to carry out their sentence 
in Peñíscola, no longer the Viscount of Castellbò.47
The common bandits who also fled to the lands of the 
Ebro River did not enjoy the same fate, such as Jaume and 
Llorenç Clua, who were actually not brothers but ene-
mies. The former, “Jaume el Bord” (“James the Wild”), 
died in 1613 from an ambush waged by the latter, who 
vanished from the documentation in around 1616. How-
ever, it is fascinating to learn about their accomplices: 
churchmen, no less. For Jaume, it was the military order 
of Hospitallers of Saint John and the knight commander 
of Miravet, whereas Llorenç had hideouts at the Cister-
cian monastery of Benifassà and the military order of 
Montesa across the border and in the heart of the King-
dom of Valencia.48 What has been confirmed is the mix-
ing of bandits, especially the Catalans, between the Prin-
cipality and the Kingdom of Valencia, in the lands of 
Maestrat Vell de Montesa as well.49
The controversial repression of banditry
As Viceroy García of Toledo said in the mid-16th centu-
ry, “all of Catalonia is rife with bandits”.50 And indeed, 
this was true even in Barcelona itself, where banditry was 
linked to other chronic urban afflictions, such as gam-
bling and prostitution.51 However, how to end this drama 
that beset the entire country, and not only its borders, 
which the gangs could always cross more easily to flee 
from their pursuers? This is a question that all the institu-
tions in the lands had to ask, even though they never 
reached valid, shared solutions. After all, no one could 
deny that the cities, the Generalitat de Catalunya, the 
Royal Audience and of course the viceroys always wanted 
to put an end to banditry. The problem was that it came 
from both above and below, since no institution was free 
of its influence, plus there were accomplices involved, 
most notably the judges of the Royal Audience. Indeed, 
the inter-class nature and vertical solidarities of banditry 
were a reality.
There was yet another issue that was more delicate: the 
Cort General (General Assembly) of Catalonia. It was the 
prime source of sovereignty and legitimacy in the Cata-
lan-speaking lands which had reached a pact with the 
king based on the 1283 constitutions, and which had been 
safeguarded despite the different dynasties that had ruled 
the country, be they Trastàmara or Habsburg. And there 
was one blaring reality: the Court had done little to enact 
laws against banditry, primarily because one of its branch-
es – the military – was opposed. In any event, the Court 
strove to ensure that the existing laws were not trampled 
upon by the royal officials, and this was totally legal, al-
though it also hindered the monopoly on force called for 
by the viceroys.
Meantime, given all this ruckus, the monarchy seemed 
mute in the Court assemblies and only spoke to give in-
structions to its viceroys, who sparked grievances as soon 
as they started governing, with protests against the Court 
over illegal actions brought not only to the viceroys but 
the king himself. Perpignan, the second city in Catalonia 
and the head of Roussillon on a military border, was con-
cerned with this. We are aware of the instructions from 
the consuls to their representatives in the Catalan Courts 
of 1585. The criticism of the military branch was flawless 
because “és cosa evident que si los fautors y los receptors no 
fossen, los predits [malfactors] no durarien ni se susten-
tarien com duren y se sustenten en dita provincia...”. But 
the same held true of royal repression: “És cosa consem-
blant a la ferosia dels pobles bàrbaros y a la dominació dels 
tyrannos prendre y capturar los submesos sots ombra y 
color de justicia y aquells de fet, ab tirannica furor i poten-
cia, fer-los matar no ohits ni defensats, y se és seguit en nos-
tros infortunats dies”.52
Given this situation, without negating the good inten-
tions of the Catalan institutions and the Generalitat, which 
at times asked for brisk action against the bandits, such as 
Joan Cadell in 1592,53 the response was lukewarm. What is 
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more, when the militias rose up in the cities upon the or-
ders of the viceroys, these unions of commoners armed to 
combat banditry were not very effective,54 and their mem-
bers paid little, since they were required to.55 Ultimately it 
seemed like these unions brought more problems than so-
lutions. They even attacked noblemen occasionally, or 
conversely, an aristocrat might summon a union;56 they 
abused the powers at times and committed “insolences 
and excesses in the performance of their duties”;57 they 
suffered from infiltrations by bandits; and they even be-
came fearful when facing down the gangs. The viceroys 
complained incessantly about this issue, since they often 
said that “como la gente de la tierra no acude ni es de prove-
cho en tales ocasiones”.58 In reality, these viceroys were 
largely alone, unaware of the laws and institutions of the 
country and without much support from the local people 
or the majority of nobles. They were always stating their 
wish to have their own soldiers, even just some regiment 
that fell down from heaven (it was pretty much a pipe-
dream that only a direct war with France could make come 
true59) because they used a light cavalry more than once; 
after all, “sin gente forastera es impossible tener limpia la 
provincia, como otras veces lo he representado a V. M.”.60
On the other hand, closely related to the more or less 
tense moments of banditry, the personal character of the 
viceroys themselves mattered, in addition to specific 
junctures in time. One example of this is the difficult case 
of the Marquis of Tarifa, viceroy between 1554 and 1558 
during the regency of Princess Joanna, who was trying to 
replace her father, Charles V, and her brother, Philip II.61 
Other viceroys sought agreements and more moderate 
policies to soothe the tensions, such as the Neapolitan 
Duke of Monteleone,62 an issue which, more than mere 
protocol, explains the heartfelt condolences that the dep-
uties from the General Deputation expressed on their 
visit to the to the viceroy in October 1610 upon the death 
of his son in Naples.63 And others stormed in ruthlessly 
wherever they went and, if needed, cast doubt on or re-
touched the Catalan constitutions. Indeed, in 1615 the 
bishop of Vic actually wrote to Philip III that the final so-
lution would be that “asiente la justicia como en Castilla y 
les quite sus malos usos y costumbres que la impiden”.64
A year later, Viceroy Alburquerque seemed not to go 
quite that far; he was a man mostly known for his brisk, 
violent actions, but in practice he firmly believed that the 
state of Catalonia was “miserable... Lo mismo digo en 
quanto a los fueros y constituciones deste Principado para 
que V. M. se sirva de no maravillarse cuando supiese que 
he atropellado por algunos dellos, que pueden estorvar la 
buena administración de la justicia”. And even though 
years later councillors of Barcelona actually praised the 
viceroy’s actions because of the (military) peace he 
brought to the city, in 1616 the Generalitat protested to 
the king about the viceroy’s statements, summarising 
them in an embassy in Madrid with a more radical phrase 
than the viceroy is said to have uttered: “Guardaré las 
constituciones que me pareciere y las demás”.65
Amazing! Banditry, which in itself was apolitical, as all 
historians report, ended up becoming the unwitting har-
binger of the Catalan Revolt of 1640. In the interim were 
years of total violence, with the burning of forests to re-
move the bandits from their refuges, and the looting of 
villages by the bandits, and a few times by the unions. 
And banditry survived no matter how much a pardon was 
offered to everyone who was willing to serve the king in 
the garrisons of Naples, Milan or the Netherlands (an of-
fer taken up by Rocaguinarda, among others) or extraor-
dinarily cruel executions were committed to serve as an 
example and strike fear, such as the execution of the ban-
dit chaplain Antoni Roca66 and those of Montserrat Poch 
and Joan Sala Serrallonga, among many others.
Comparative epilogue and conclusions
As I prepare to conclude this compressed summary, 
which obviously does not cover every aspect of banditry, I 
should recall that at the start I stressed the fact that phe-
nomenon of banditry was not unique to Catalonia. Even a 
cursory glance at the entire Mediterranean world around 
the same time proves this point, beyond what Braudel’s 
oft-cited vision did, by filling in details and adding further 
nuances. Indeed, there was banditry, and not just the kind 
Figure 4. Llibre de pau i treva, J. Callís (Biblioteca del Col·legi 
d’Advocats de Barcelona). The photo is by Ramon Manent (Mataró).
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stemming from poverty, around the entire Mediterrane-
an, even in the Ottoman Empire. Just like the nobility in 
Catalonia, the powers had a great deal to do with the sur-
vival of bandits who would otherwise have perished. And 
just like in the Principality, clientelist and even family re-
lationships sought protection against possible revenge 
which lurked everywhere in a cross-section of society that 
affected everyone.
Xavier Torres has spoken about Mafioso features67 and 
the existence of true private wars. His perspective was 
based on an entire body of literature known until 1998 
which I shall not cite here; instead I will refer readers to 
his research. However, this body of literature has been ex-
panded in recent years. And on this point there is an issue 
which not only situates Braudel’s aforementioned work 
as a classic but also is accepted by all historians today. In 
brief, the bandits did not solely represent protest or social 
rebellion, as described by Eric Hobsbawm, seeking a cur-
rent of sympathy or complicity between the bandits, al-
most like the myth of Robin Hood and the common folk 
to whom they redistributed the wealth. In addition to re-
flecting a purportedly Marxist thesis, this theory also re-
flects the type of source used by Hobsbawm, more literary 
and almost romantic than archivistic.68 Today for exam-
ple, Bruno Pomara quite clearly states that in Baroque 
Sicily, we cannot continue along this course because curi-
ously at that time neither Palermo, the capital, where 
large number of nobility resided, nor Messini, the top silk 
producing and exporting city, could be described as poor, 
and yet banditry had risen on the island.69
In the case of Naples, not even Marco Sciarra, who was 
born in Abruzzo and was often considered the leading 
“social bandit” of his day (the late 16th century), fit this 
profile.70 Ultimately, Sciarra was actually rented out, al-
most like a condottiero, in fights in the Papal States be-
tween noble Roman lords and the Holy See. Similar ex-
amples can be found in Genoa,71 underscoring 
relationships and factions, in Sardinia72 and in many oth-
er places around the Mediterranean. We even have his-
torical biographies like the one on Giovanni Beatrice, ali-
as Zanzanù,73 the bandit from Lake Garda near Brescia, 
which is reminiscent of more than one biography written 
in Catalonia many years ago.74
But returning now to the Crown of Aragón, we can see 
how banditry existed in regions other than just Catalonia, 
and how some also bore the mark of opposing factions, 
such as Mallorca.75 There is also a major body of literature 
in Aragón and Valencia, especially in the Kingdom of Va-
lencia. In an overall survey of banditry in the Crown of 
Aragón, Emília Salvador underscored all of these cases, 
especially Valencia, by noting its ties with the other king-
doms and the Principality. In consequence, I shall refer to 
her work in order to avoid a long list of titles in Valen-
cia,76 some of them from before 1650, although there was 
a certain form of Catalan banditry back then.77
After a series of congresses which have been held in re-
cent years,78 the new literature on banditry in Catalonia 
and much of Europe, especially around the Mediterrane-
an, has overturned our global, general views of this phe-
nomenon. After all, banditry might stem from poverty; 
from a history of social unrest; from private wars domi-
nated by the powerful, primarily nobles; from networks of 
families; from clientelism; or from a host of different fac-
tors. And that is precisely the problem today: researchers’ 
obligation to descend to a local micro-historical level that 
seeks family groups, their origins and their interrelations. 
Not too long ago, in a fitting self-criticism by Xavier Tor-
res, and in relation to examples such as the ones provided 
by Giovanni Levi,79 the main conclusion was the need for 
micro-history in studies on bandits. Torres also warned 
that the major problem of these studies, which were inno-
vative yet overly local, would be to ignore the broader un-
derlying problems through connectors, as he called them. 
However, trying to research village by village and then gain 
a new general perspective is quite difficult and requires a lot 
of time. Yet this is the pathway being taken by the members 
of a research triennium, not all of whom are cited in this 
article yet all of whom must be borne in mind, even though 
they know that their efforts will take years to bear fruit. For 
this reason, research into banditry is on a slow pathway to-
day, but one that is being thoroughly investigated.80
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